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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-v-
RICHARD HATFIELD NICKLES AND : Case No, 19221 
MARGARET K. NICKLES, Category No. 2 
Defendants/Appellants : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by the 
Court on October 7, 1986. Originally this case was an appeal from 
convictions and judgments imposed for Aggravated Arson, a felony in 
the Second Degree, and Insurance Fraud, a felony of the Second 
Degree, in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, Presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at 2-16. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated the standard for the granting of a 
petition for rehearing: "To justify a rehearing, a strong case must 
be made. We must be convinced that the court failed to consider 
some material point in the case, or that it erred in its 
conclusions, . . . ." In Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P.619 at 624 
(Utah 1913), the Court declared: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions for 
rehearings in proper cases. When this court, 
however, has considered and decided all of the 
material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong principle 
of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result . . 
. . If there are some reasons, however, such as 
we have indicated above, or other good reasons, a 
petition for a rehearing should be promptly filed 
and, if it is meritorious, its form will in no 
case be scrutinized by this court. 
The argument section of this brief will establish that, applying 
these standards, the Appellant's petition for rehearing is properly 
before the Court and should be granted. Indeed, in its opinion, 
State v. Nickles, 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, (filed Oct. 7, 1986), 
(Addendum A). This court has misapprehended and overlooked issues 
of fact and law. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
IN PROSECUTING APPELLANTS' CASE WARRANTS A NEW TRIAL 
In the opinion in this case his court held that if a 
defendant fails to move for disqualification of a prosecutor at the 
trial level, the defendant must subsequently demonstrate that he was 
actually prejudiced by the prosecutor's conflict of interest to 
justify an order for a new trial on this "actual prejudice" standard 
is applied even if the defendant did not know, and had no reason to 
know, of the prosecutor's conflict at the time of trial. Such a 
standard is impossible to meet and constitutes a dangerous 
diminution of a prosecutor's ethical and legal obligations. 
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While it may be sound legal policy to require the actual 
prejudice standard on appeal in a case where the defendant knew or 
had reason to know of the prosecutor's conflict at the time of trial 
[See U.S. v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981)], the standard is 
not sound policy in a case in which the defendant could not be 
expected to know of the conflict at the time of trial. 
Presumably, according to the opinion in this case, if a 
defendant had moved for disqualification at the time of trial, this 
Court would apply an appearance of conflict standard on appeal. 
However, the Court's opinion expressed concern about a defendant who 
tries to take advantage of the system, to "become the unintended 
[beneficiary] of a rule that attempts to promote the public good." 
Nickles at 25. Yet, this concern would only arise in a case in 
which the defendant knew, or had reason to know, of a prosecutorial 
conflict of interest at the time of trial, but failed to timely 
raise the issue, thus inviting error. The Court may fairly infer 
that a defendant who knows or should know of a conflict at the time 
of trial, but did not raise the issue, did not himself consider the 
potential for actual prejudice to be very great and has thus waived 
the issue. This is the situation described in U.S. v. Heldt, supra, 
a case cited by the Court in support of the actual prejudice 
standard delivered in the opinion in this case. See especially, 
Heldt at 1277, footnote 81. 
In Heldt, the defendant Church of Scientology claimed on 
appeal for the first time that it was denied due process of law by 
an alleged prosecutorial conflict of interest. Heldt at 1275. The 
Church of Scientology had filed a civil suit against the U.S. 
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Attorney's Office prior to its criminal trial. Heldt at 1275. The 
church claimed that because two prosecutors were defendants in the 
civil trialf they were self-interested in its outcome and thus could 
not fairly prosecute the criminal charge. J[d.. The court noted that 
even though the church knew of the alleged conflict at the time of 
trial/ it failed to raise the issuef along with other asserted 
grounds, in its Motion to Disqualify/ made at the time of trial. 
Heldt at 1277. The Court found the alleged conflict to be very 
weak/ basing this finding in large part on the fact that even though 
the defendants knew of the conflict at the time of trial/ "[the 
conflict] was not at all apparent/ as evidenced by the fact that 
appellants never relied on it as a basis for disqualification." 
Id. Under these circumstances the Court held that when defendants 
have failed to move to disqualify on the ground of a conflict of 
interest/ yet assert a denial of due process on appeal/ actual 
prejudice must be shown to justify a new trial. IQ. The holding of 
Heldt is limited to the situation where a defendant knew of the 
conflict at the time of trial/ yet failed to raise it in his Motion 
to Disqualify. This is simply not the situation in the case now 
before the court. Neither the Nickles nor their attorney knew of 
Christiansen1s corporate involvement/ or of his private business 
dealings with the insurance adjusting company that investigated this 
case or of the prosecutor's personal financial interest in pleasing 
r
 that adjusting company, which investigated the Nickles firef until 
November of 1982/ some five months after the trial. (R. 2431). In 
short, neither the Nickles nor their attorney knew of the high 
degree of risk of actual prejudice that existed at the time of their 
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trial until well after the Nickles were convicted. The Court, 
however, seems to have overlooked this crucial distinguishing 
characteristic between the instant case and Heldt. This is 
evidenced by the Courtfs statement that the "defendants failed to 
move in the trial court to disqualify the prosecutor and only now, 
on appeal, assert a denial of due process and equal protection." 
Nickles at 25. This comment by the Court, and its reliance upon 
Heldt appears to indicate that the Court believed that the Nickles 
knew at the time of trial of the conflict, yet failed to raise the 
issue. As demonstrated, the record clearly shows that this is a 
misapprehension of fact. 
In the opinion in this case, the Court also cited Wright v. 
United States, 732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1984) as support for the 
adoption of the actual prejudice standard. The opinion quoted the 
following from Wright; 
[T]he degree of prosecutorial misconduct ... 
and the degree of prejudice to the defendant 
necessary to justify action by a reviewing court 
steadily increase as the case goes forward, with 
the least being required on a motion to disqualify, 
somewhat more on a pre-trial motion to dismiss an 
indictment, still more on a motion in the district 
court after conviction but before appeal, [and] 
somewhat more on a direct appeal. . . . 
43 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25 citing 732 F.2d at 1056 n.8. 
However, the uncited remainder of the quote goes on to say " . . . 
[and] a good deal more on collateral attack" Wright at 1056, 
footnote 8. Appellants argue that taken as a whole, this quotation 
supports the notion that cases should be reviewed on an individual 
basis to ascertain the potential for actual prejudice based upon the 
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strength of the apparent conflict. Certainly, cases arise which 
contain slight evidence of a conflict sufficient to disqualify a 
prosecutor at the trial level but insufficient to cause an appellate 
court to remand for a new trial. However, the issue in this case, 
addressed by Wright, concerns the potential for actual prejudice 
created by a prosecutor acting due to improper motivation to 
investigate, initiate, and try a case. Contrary to the assertion in 
the opinion in this case, Wright does not require a showing that the 
defendant was in fact prejudiced by the prosecutor's conflict. 
Wright only notes that it is the better policy to require that the 
risk the defendant was actually prejudiced be greater to justify an 
order of a new trial on appeal, than is necessary to disqualify a 
prosecutor at trial. Wright at 1056. The degree of risk, the 
danger that the prosecutor acted due to improper motivation, in 
effect, the potential for actual prejudice, is what should be 
considered by the court on appeal. This can be effectively 
determined by a facial evaluation of the nature of the conflict 
itself. 
A requirement that the defendant show actual prejudice on 
appeal is, for practical purposes, an impossible standard to meet. 
The degree of risk that the prosecutor acted due to improper 
motivation, the possibility of actual prejudice, is all that can be 
shown by a defendant. Indeed, in most cases, the sole source of 
information concerning a prosecutorial conflict is the prosecutor 
himself. A defendant and his attorney are at the mercy of the 
prosecutor concerning what is disclosed about such a conflict. The 
prosecutor may disclose as much or as little as he chooses regarding 
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the conflict* However/ to believe that in most instances a 
prosecutor would admit to an improper motivation/ risking both the 
prosecution and possibly his career, is surely the paradigm of 
naivete . Yetf in effect/ this Court holds that absent such 
disclosure, a defendant has no remedy available on appeal/ no matter 
how improper a prosecutor's conduct "appears." The court thus 
shifts the entire risk of undisclosed actual prejudice to the 
defendant* 
In reversing the defendant's conviction because of the 
failure of the prosecutor to recuse himself due to an apparent 
conflict of interest/ the New York Court of Appeals articulated the 
sound reasoning for adopting a "reasonable potential for prejudice" 
standard for appellate review of such cases: 
It would be simplistic therefore to think of 
the impact of a prosecutor's conflict of interest 
merely in terms of explicit instances of abuse. 
Even our thumbnail description of prosecutorial 
power is enough to indicate that resulting 
prejudice can at least as easily flow from an act 
of omission as from one of commission/ from 
discretion withheld as from discretion 
exercised. In this context/ whether abuse is 
express or implied may be difficult to 
determine. Suffice it to say that any 
presumption of impartiality tends to be 
undermined when there is a clear conflict of 
interest. Indeed/ the judgmental nature of much 
of a District Attorney's conduct will put it 
beyond effective appellate review. And, no 
matter how firmly and conscientiously a District 
Attorney may steel himself against the intrusion 
of a competing and disqualifying interest/ he 
never can be certain that he has succeeded in 
isolating himself from the inroads on his 
subconscious. 
[1] Thus/ the practical impossibility of 
establishing that the conflict has worked to 
defendant's disadvantage dictates the adoption of 
standards under which a reasonable potential for 
prejudice will suffice. 
-7 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Furthermore, the Court stated: 
It was important that these responsibilities, 5 
carried out in the name of the State and under 
the color of the law, be conducted in a manner 
that fostered rather than discouraged public 
confidence in our government and the system of 
law to which it is dedicated. This concern, that 
those occupying prosecutorial office be jealous 
of the evidences as well as the substance of 
integrity, was not to be discounted. In 
particular, the District Attorney, as guardian of 
this public trust, should have abstained from an 
identification, in appearance as well as in fact, 
with more than one side of the controversy. 
People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E. 2d 705 at 707, 708 (N.Y. 1980). 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
This reasoning persuasively demonstrates that the adoption 
of an "actual prejudice" standard for appellate review of 
prosecutorial cases conflict severely diminishes safeguards for 
ensuring that the prosecutor meet his ethical and legal obligations 
and dramatically increases the danger that defendants will be 
unjustly prosecuted and convicted. Under the standard adopted by 
this court, a prosecutor who is so disposed can bring charges and 
prosecute to further his own personal interest, with little fear 
that a subsequent conviction will be overturned absent the discovery 
of "smoking pistol." 
In the instant case, the State conceded that "Michael 
Christiansen should not have been the attorney to investigate, file 
charges in and prosecute the defendants1 case" Brief of Respondent 
p. 41. Obviously, the State could not have reached such a 
conclusion unless it believed the potential for actual prejudice to 
be high, not only at the time of trial, but at the time the case was 
investigated and charges were filed. However, the opinion in the 
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case assumed that the risk of actual prejudice was not high because 
"all work performed by [Christiansen] on this case from the time of 
the fire in October of 1980 until June of 1981/ when he discontinued 
his association with AFI/ was performed in his capacity as Deputy 
County Attorney." Nickles at 26. This conclusion assumes the very 
question at issue—that because prosecutor/ Christiansen said there 
was no involvement/ there was no conflict of interest/ thus no 
actual prejudice. Yetf given the inherent self-interest of the 
prosecutor to conceal his actual motivation/ the Court/ like the 
defendant/ can only examine the appearance of conflict. Despite 
prosecutor Christiansen's assertion that no conflict existed, (R. 
2483-84)/ the facts amply illustrate that the prosecutor's loyalties 
were divided. Indeed/ at the time this case was investigated and 
charges were filed/ prosecutor Christiansen's AFI was an active 
business/ soliciting new investigations and completing old ones. 
Under the Court's analysis in this casef the potential for prejudice 
at these critical stages of the Nickles prosecution was very high. 
While Christiansen's corporation/ AFIf had apparently 
ceased most business activities at the time of the Nickles' trial 
(R. 2486-87)/ the company was still a viable business entity with 
Mike Christiansen at its helm. (R. 2488). The risk of actual 
prejudice ended only when AFI was dissolved in December of 1982/ 
well after the trial in this case. (R. 2488). 
Furthermore/ it is at least possible, that at the time of 
trial/ Christiansen retained strong personal interest in the future 
of AFI. At the time of the Nickles' trial/ AFI was still an 
existing, viable corporate entity. (R. 2488). Christiansen was 
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still an officer. (R. 2488). The possibility of future business 
operations and Christiansen's involvement therein, was thus a 
distinct possibility. Indeed, the fact that Christiansen did not 
dissolve the corporation until a year and a half after his superiors 
in the County Attorney's office ordered him to cease his involvement 
(R.2488, 2491-92), evidences his hope of future business for AFI. 
Because the possibility of future business for AFI still 
existed, Christiansen's motivation for attracting and maintaining 
potential sources of future income for AFI still existed. General 
Adjustment Bureau, (GAB), the insurance adjusting agency that 
investigated the Nickles fire, was the same company that gave AFI 
the majority of its business. (R. 2464-71). Prosecutor 
Christiansen's motivation for pleasing GAB is thus obvious. Surely 
nothing could please this source of past and future income more than 
a successful prosecution on a half million dollar claim, of a man 
GAB had vowed they were "out to get.1" (R. 2523). 
The conclusion regarding the potential for actual prejudice 
is inescapable given these facts. Simply, at the time of trial the 
prosecutor could well have entertained hopes of the continued 
viability of his private company and have been motivated to please a 
past and likely future substantial source of income for that 
company. The Nickles contend that this "apparent" conflict is 
significant enough to justify reversal even under the Wright 
"sliding scale" analysis. 
For the reasons discussed above, the better reasoned policy 
requires that a showing of reasonable potential for actual prejudice 
be adopted by this Court as the standard for appellate review of 
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prosecutorial conflicts of interest. Appellants therefore ask the 
court to reconsider its standard requiring a showing of "actual 
prejudice" and remard their case for new trial, free from the risk 
that their case will be prejudiced by a prosecutor serving two 
masters. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this court has overlooked critical issues of fact 
and law in this case and because the Court has delineated a standard 
which is impossible to attain, the Appellants respectfully petition 
this Court to reconsider its decision in this case and reverse their 
convictions and remand the case for a new trial. 
d*> 
Respectfully submitted this Tr^ day of November, 1986. 
LMA£+< C- Tte^ut^ 
CURTIS C. NESSET-
Attorney for Petitioner 
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I hereby certify that I delivered four copies of the 
foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 7^"day of November, 
1986.
 r 
LUAAJJ^ l. ^ ^*<tg/"~ 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Petitioner 
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for appellant/petitioner in this 
case and; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this frf^day of November, 1986. 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Cite as 
43 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Richard Hatfield NICKLES and Margaret K. 
Nickles, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 19221 
FILED: October 7, 1986 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Hon. Peter F. Leary 
Hon. James Sawaya 
ATTORNEYS: 
Curtis Nesset for Defendants and Appellants. 
David L. Wilkinson, Dave B. Thompson for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Defendants Richard Hatfield Nickles and 
Margaret K. Nickles appeal their convictions 
of aggravated arson and insurance fraud. 
In the early morning hours of October 30, 
1980, while defendants and their two daugh-
ters, Kimberly and Diane, were on a trip to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EftS 43 UTAHADV 
California, an explosion and fire occurred at 
their home in Salt Lake County. An investig-
ation by the Salt Lake County Fire Depart-
ment and Arson Task Force (ATF) uncovered 
evidence of arson. Defendants were subsequ-
ently charged with aggravated arson and 
insurance fraud, both second degree felonies, 
under U.C.A., 1953, §76-6-103 (1978) and 
§76-6-521 (1978), respectively. They were 
found guilty as charged. Mr. Nickles was 
sentenced to two concurrent sentences of one 
to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Mrs. Nickles was given an identical sentence, 
but the court placed her on probation. Both 
were ordered to pay fines as well as restitu-
tion. 
I. 
Defendants first contend that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the verdict of 
the jury. Our standard of review in this 
regard is well established; we review the evid-
ence and the inferences to be drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. State v. Dumas, 111 P.2d 502 (Utah 
1986); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 
(Utah 1982). 
Cause of Fire 
Defendants maintain that reasonable doubt 
exists, as a matter of law, whether the explo: 
sion and fire were arson caused, and that 
even if they were, whether defendants are the 
guilty parties. To prevail on this contention, 
defendants must show that the evidence was 
so insubstantial or inclusive that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that they committed the crime charged. 
State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983). 
Section 76-6-103 (1978), in effect at the time 
they were charged, provides that "[a] person 
is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of 
fire or explosives he intentionally and unlaw-
fully damages ... a habitable structure." The 
record reflects the evidence of an arson-
caused explosion and fire. 
In June of 1980, several months before the 
fire, the fire marshall and captain of the 
Murray City Fire Department was asked by 
Mr. Nickles to visit Composter Corporation, 
a business operated by defendants. Mr. 
Nickles expressed his concern that the opera-
tors of an adjacent boat manufacturing busi-
ness, who were experiencing financial prob-
lems, might attempt to burn down their buil-
ding. In response to his question about what 
products the boat manufacturers might have 
in their possession to set fires, the fire mars-
hall told Nickles that liquid acetone could be 
used. Although he made at least five subseq-
uent visits to Mr. Nickles at Composter 
Corporation during July and August, he 
testified that he had not seen signs of an 
For cumuJative UTAH CODE 
,NCE REPORTS J l 
ongoing business at Composter on any visit. 
Several weeks later, on August 13, 1980, 
Composter Corporation borrowed $75,000 
from Capital Thrift & Loan. The note was 
signed by defendants individually and by Mr. 
Nickles as president of the corporation. Their 
home was mortgaged as security for the loan, 
and according to defendants, the loan was to 
be paid out of the proceeds from its expected 
sale. 
Defendants' home had been on the market 
at various times during 1980, and at the time 
of the fire was listed with one Alice Blair, a* 
real estate agent, who had listed the home on 
October 3, 1980, for $239,000. She testified 
that she had not shown the home nor did she 
have any potential buyers, and that defend-
ants had refused to give her a key, claiming 
that a complex burglar alarm system had 
been installed. Blair had also been unable to 
schedule an open house, even on a weekend 
defendants were going to be out of town, 
despite her repeated efforts to do so. 
Defendants' home was covered by a "Cadi-
llac" insurance policy which was increased 
from $165,000 to $250,000 in January of 
1980. This increase, made at their request, 
was to cover the refurbishing of their home. 
In early October of 1980, Mrs. Nickles 
secured a "rider" for silverware in the 
amount of $17,280 which became effective on 
October 10, 1980. Before the date of the fire 
on October 30th, Mrs. Nickles, her daughters 
and the family's two dogs left for California. 
Mr. Nickles planned to fly to Los Angeles for 
business meetings and then join his family in 
Santa Maria. 
On the evening of October 28, Mr. Nickles 
telephoned a neighbor, Linda Dickert, and 
told her that he had a casserole he wanted to 
give her because he was leaving town at noon 
the next day. Dickert's fourteen-year-old 
son, David, went over to pick up the casse-
role and found it sitting outside on a flower 
box. He did not go inside the house. He 
noticed that one of defendants' cars was 
backed up in the driveway with the trunk 
opened, approximately ten feet from the 
door. Several days earlier, Mrs. Nickles had 
asked David to care for their cat while they 
were away. She had on previous occasions 
given the Dickerts the key to the house; this 
time, however, she placed the cat's food and 
bowls bn the porch outside the front door. 
As Dickert was getting ready to go to bed, 
about 3:00 a.m. on October 29th, she noticed 
that lights were on in nearly every room of 
defendants' house. She did not notice any 
movement or activity. At the trial, she testi-
fied that she had heard defendants talk about 
acetone in connection with their business, 
that she had seen a gallon container of 
acetone in their home, and that Mrs. Nickles 
had offered to lend, her some acetone, clai-
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22 
ming that she had it by the "barrelful." 
Mr. Nickles was in California with his 
family at the time he received a call infor-
ming him of the explosion and fire. They 
returned to Salt Lake City on November 2, 
three days later. In an interview with a special 
agent for ATF and the Salt Lake County 
Special Arson Fire Enforcement Unit, Mr. 
Nickles stated that he had left for California 
on Wednesday, October 29, at 11:50 a.m. He 
indicated that only two families knew of his 
travel plans and that no one had been given a 
key to the house. He also stated that certain 
valuables had been removed from the house 
due to concerns about a possible burglary. 
Birth certificates and personal papers had 
also been removed from the house vault and 
sterling silver had been placed in the vault for 
safekeeping. During that interview, Mr. 
Nickles inquired as to whether a timing 
device had been found. Fire investigators 
testified that they had observed evidence of a 
flammable liquid explosion, multiple points 
of fire origin, "pour patterns," and "puddle" 
areas indicative of fire origin. A device cons-
isting of a light bulb embedded in a large 
amount of newspaper ash with an electrical 
wire running from the base of the light bulb 
socket to an electrical outlet in the wall was 
found on the floor of defendants' daughter, 
Kimberly's basement bedroom. Also found 
were "trailers" leading out of her bedroom 
into th* hallway. The window and its frame 
in Kimberly's bedroom were blown out. 
Investigators found several acetone soaked 
suitcases under the stairway, in the basement. 
Expert testimony at trial disclosed that the 
pour patterns in the house, coupled with the 
melted steel on a glass door, indicated that 
flammable liquid had been poured on the 
floor of the house before the fire. Experts 
also testified that explosion was not consis-
tent with a natural gas explosion, and was 
not likely caused by swamp gas. Finally, 
experts testified that a "wet-type" explosion 
associated with flammable liquids produced 
"instant fire," and identified the device found 
as one commonly used by arsonists to ignite 
fires. 
The explosion hurled glass onto roofs and 
into yards of nearby houses. Windows were 
blown out in a neighbor's house, and the 
house directly south of defendants' was 
singed by flames. Firemen arrived within 
minutes of being summoned to fight the fire. 
When they arrived the home was engulfed in 
flames. The fire was very hot and difficult to 
estinguish. 
The foregoing facts presented substantial 
evidence which established, beyond a reason-
able doubt, that the fire had been caused by 
arson. 
Guilt of Defendants 
NCE REPORTS a y s 
Inasmuch as the jury believed that the fire 
had been arson caused, it is reasonable that it 
would also find from that same evidence that 
defendants committed the arson. Although 
the evidence connecting defendants to the 
crime is primarily circumstantial, it is a well-
settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone 
may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the 
accused. State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 
(Utah 1982);. State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3 
(Utah 1982); State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 
676 P^d 31, cert denied, 104 Sup. Ct. 3592 
(1983); People v. Pierce, 155 Cah Rptr. 657, 
595 P.2d 91 (1979); State v. Brady, 2 Ariz. 
App. 210, 407 P.2d 399 (1965). Circumstan-
tial evidence n zd not be regarded as inferior 
evidence if it is of such quality and quantity 
as to justify a jury in determining guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient 
to sustain a conviction. State v. Weaver, 637 
P.2d23(Mont. 1981). , 
The jury could reasonably infer the follo-
wing facts from the circumstantial evidence 
presented ,at trial: the defendants were in 
serious financial trouble and made plans to 
burn down their house to solve their 
problem; that they increased the insurance on 
their house so they would receive more 
money from the policy; that Mrs. Nickels 
refused to give the realtor a key because she 
wanted to assist Mr. Nickles in setting the 
house up for the fire; that she had lied about 
the burglar alarm system because she planned 
to claim it on the proof-of-loss statement; 
that Mr. Nickles put the casserole outside 
because he did not want the neighbor's son in 
his house to observe the fire preparations; 
that Mrs. Nickles put the cat's food out on 
the porch and did not give the neighbor's son 
the key because she did not want the cat to be 
inside when the fire started; that she took the 
family dogs with her to California for the 
same reason; that the lights were on at 3:00 
a.m. because Mr. Nickles was setting the fire; 
and Finally, that defendants took their time 
returning from California because they were 
not shocked or surprised by news of the fire. 
If the jury concluded that each defendant, 
either directly committed the defense or aided 
in its commission, the verdict must be susta-
ined. The jury had before it considerable 
circumstantial evidence from which it could 
have concluded that defendants committed 
arson, either directly in the case of Mr. 
Nickles, or indirectly by aiding and assisting, 
in the case of Mrs. Nickles. 
Insurance Fraud 
Defendants also contend that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict finding them guilty of insurance 
fraud. On December 30, 1980, two months 
after the fire, defendants submitted a proof-
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of-loss statement to their insurance carrier. 
The statement listed approximately 1700 
items and claimed $233,353.29 for the house, 
$134,000 for contents, $53,600 for loss of 
use, $12,876 for silver, $3,800 for furs, 
$6,500 for landscape, and $360 for other 
structures. 
Insurance adjusters assigned to the case 
testified that numerous items of the greatest 
value were not found in the remains of the 
fire, and that, at best, only 50°7o of the items 
claimed by defendants in their proof-of-loss 
statement were located. Investigators with the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office were 
unable to verify purchases of several major 
items, including the sterling silver purportedly 
purchased at ZCMI, and other items allegedly 
purchased by defendants and claimed in their 
proof-of-loss statement. 
Defendants assert that their submission of 
an insurance claim which may have included 
inaccurate estimates of value does not alone 
constitute fraud. We concede that it does not; 
however, under U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-521, 
we note that the jury, without addressing the 
accuracy of the submitted estimates, could 
easily find that defendants did commit insur-
ance fraud. Section 76-6-521 provides: 
Every person who presents, or causes 
to be presented, any false or fraudu-
lent claim, or any proof in support of , 
any such claim, upon any contract of 
insurance for the payment of any 
loss, or who prepares, makes or 
subscribes any amount, certificate of 
survey, affidavit or proof of loss, or 
other book, paper or writing, with 
intent to present or use the same, or 
to allow it to be presented or used, in 
support of any such claim is punish-
able as in the manner prescribed for 
theft of property of like value. 
The plans submitted to the insurance 
company for reconstruction of defendants' 
house included, among other things, an inte-
rcom system and a burglar alarm system, 
neither of which had been in the home prior 
to the fire. In fact, at the trial, Mrs. Nickles 
testified that the house did not have a burglar 
alarm system or an intercom system. From 
the evidence presented at trial, it is clear that 
defendants, despite the difficult conditions 
under which they were required to prepare 
their proof-of-loss statement, presented a 
"false or fraudulent claim" to their insurance 
company. Even if the jury had chosen to 
disbelieve the testimony of fire investigators 
as to items they were unable to locate or 
identify in the rubble, the undisputed evid-
ence that defendants claimed a nonexistent 
burglar alarm system and intercom system on 
their proof-of-loss statement is sufficient 
evidence to support the verdict finding defe-
ndants guilty of insurance fraud. A determi-
nation of whether their claim was excessive 
on other items is unnecessary inasmuch as the 
defendants did submit a fraudulent claim 
intentionally misrepresenting the existence of 
these two items* See State v. Kitchen, 564 
P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1977). 
% . • • : * ; . • . • • . • * • . ' : ' ; - f l ' • ; ' • 
- II. ;"- : " ' 
Defendants next contend that evidence of a 
telephone call received by an employee of 
ATF approximately three weeks after the fire, 
from a caller purporting to be Mr. Nickles, 
was inadmissible because there was no authe-
ntication or identification of the caller. It is 
well established that communications by tele-
phone are admissible in evidence where othe-
rwise, relevant to the facts and issue. 29 Am. 
Jur. 2d Evidence §380 (and cases cited 
therein). The identity of a caller may be esta-
blished by circumstantial evidence. United' 
States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022 (1979); 
Grogan v. United States, 394 F.2d 287 (5th 
Cir. 1967); State v. Peele, 54 N.C. App. 247, 
282 S.E.2d 578 (1981). Further, if the party 
calling, in addition to a statement of his 
identity, relates facts and circumstances 
which, taken with other established facts, 
tends to reveal his identity, the conversation 
is admissible. State v. Marler, 94 Idaho 803, 
498 P.2d 1276 (1972); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evide-
nce § 384. Here, both requirements were 
satisfied. At the trial, the following testimony 
was given by Elaine Rice, a secretary for 
ATF: 
Q: At the time that you received the 
call from the person calling, did the 
person calling identify himself? 
A: He identified himself to be himself , 
a Dick Nickles, yes. 
Q: Yes. ' '•' 
Q: Did the person purporting to be 
Mr. Nickles have any further conver-
sation with you? 
A:Yes. 
Q: If you would, to the best of your 
recollection, describe or state what -
the person purporting to be Mr. 
4
 Nickles or Mr. Dick Nickles stated to 
you during the course of the convers-
ation.... 
A: He was asking about some articles 
that had been removed from his home 
and then mentioned to me that there 
had been a suspected arson at his 
home and that he had been suspec-
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t(ed] of it and commented that wasn't / 
it lucky he had been 800 miles away 
with the Secretary of the Department 
of Energy and that he would have ; 
needed a very long fuse or a time-
delay. 
Then, he again came back to the 
fact that these articles were missing 
and I asked what was missing and he t 
said some silverware and other things, 
whole drawers full. And I told him I 
didn't believe we had them and that 
he said possibly they had been 
removed for safekeeping. 
I told him that I didn't think we 
had them, but that I would have [the 
investigator] call when he got back to 
the Office. 
If we examine this conversation in light of 
the principles stated above, it is clear that the 
testimony of Eileen Rice reveals that the 
caller identified himself as Mr. Nickles. 
Further, he offered information to the empl-
oyee that only he or someone in his family 
would have known. Although certain infor-
mation pertaining to the fire had been made 
public by the media, there is nothing in the 
record to controvert the logical inferences to 
be drawn from this information, i.e., that the 
caller was in fact Mr. Nickles. Defendants 
rely on Stare v. Marler, supra, to support 
their contention that the lower court should 
not have admitted the telephone call into 
evidence. We find their reliance to be mispl-
aced. Although the court in that case deter-
mined that a "mere statement of his identity 
by the caller is insufficient proof of the call-
er's identity," it also acknowledged that 
corroboration of a statement of identity by 
the caller sufficient to render the conversation 
admissible against him may be supplied by 
evidence "that the subject matter of the call 
revealed that only the named party would 
likely have knowledge of those conversational 
facts," or of other confirming circumstances 
which make it probable that the named 
person was, in fact, the speaker." Id. at 1281 
(citations omitted; emphasis added). 
in Sfafe v. Hamilton, 185 Mont. 522, 605 
P.2d 1121 (1980), cert, denied, 447 U.S. 924, 
the Montana Supreme Court noted: 
The completeness of the identification 
goes to the weight of the evidence 
rather than to its admissibility, and 
the responsibility lies in the first inst-
ance with the District Court to deter-
mine within its sound discretion 
whether the threshold of admissibility 
has been met. 
Id. at 1128 (citation omitted). We find no 
abuse of discretion here, and find that the 
lower court properly admitted testimony of 
the phone call into evidence. 
III. • 
Defendants' third contention is that they 
were denied their right to a fair trial due to 
the individual and cumulative effect of evid-
ence which they claim was inadmissible 
because it was irrelevant or immaterial. Rule 
401, } Utah R. Evid., defines "relevant evid-
ence" as "evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequerice 16 the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence/ At the trial, 
defense counsel objected, among other 
things, to the admission of the neighbor's 
testimony concerning the lights being on in 
defendants' home in the early morning hours 
of October 29, as well as evidence pertaining 
to other accellerants, the amount of insurance 
coverage on the property, and the proximity 
of defendants' business to a thrift store. 
We cannot find that the lower court abused 
its discretion by admitting this evidence. Even 
if some of these admissions had been error, 
in light of the other evidence presented at 
trial, it would be harmless error in that there 
is no reasonable likelihood in the absence of 
this evidence there would have been a diffe* 
rent result in defendants' trial. See State v. 
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982). 
IV, 
Defendants next contend that the trial 
court failed to properly instruct the jury on 
the elements of insurance fraud by refusing 
to give their requested Instruction No. 14. 
That instruction included, as an element tb be 
proved for conviction of the crime of insur-
ance fraud, that the jury must find that defe-
ndants submitted values for items on their 
proof-of-loss statement which were intentio-
nally excessive, not just merely inaccurate, 
estimates of value. They claim that this defi-
ciency may have confused the jury to the 
extent that it reached a guilty verdict without 
sufficient evidence of criminal conduct. We 
find this contention to be without merit. The 
court's Instruction No. 21 adequately differ-
entiates between intentional fraud and reaso-
nable error in the submissions of estimates of 
value. That instruction reads: 
You are instructed that an act comm-
itted or in omission made under 
ignorance or a mistake of fact which ' 
disproves any criminal intent is not a 
crime. Thus a person is not guilty of a 
crime if he acts under an honest and 
reasonable belief in the existence of , 
certain facts and circumstances 
which, if true, would make such an 
act or an omission lawful. If you find 
that the defendants, or either one, 
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because of a reasonable mistake* 
made certain claims upon an insur-
ance company believing such claims 
to be true to the best of his knowl-
edge, then you must find him hot 
guilty of insurance fraud. 
(Emphasis added.) As we noted above, defe-
ndants' intention to submit a fraudulent 
claim is clear from the undisputed evidence 
that they claimed a nonexistent burglar alarm 
system and intercom system. Thus, the court 
properly instructed the jury on the elements-
of insurance fraud. 
V. 
Defendants' final contention is that they 
are entitled to a new trial because there was a 
conflict of interest on the part of the deputy 
county attorney assigned to prosecute this 
case. Earlier, we remanded this case to the 
trial court for supplemental proceedings on 
the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. Defe-
ndants moved the court for a new trial based 
on the evidence presented at that hearing. 
The trial court denied their motion, finding 
among other things, that "the case was tried 
and conviction[s] obtained upon evidence and 
facts developed and found upon investigation 
of the Salt Lake County Fire Department and 
notAFL" 
The prosecutor had been employed by the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office since 
1976. In 1979, he began prosecuting arson 
and insurance fraud cases, and received trai-
ning in arson and insurance fraud investiga-
tion from the National Fire Academy. In 
June or July of 1980, the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office was a recipient of a federal 
grant to establish a countywide arson task 
force, and he became the lead prosecutor for 
that group (ATF). The full task force investi-
gated the fire at defendants' home. He, along 
with other task force personnel,, reviewed this 
case for possible criminal charges. 
The fire at defendants' home occurred 
October 30, 1980. In late March of 1981, 
approximately five months later, the prosec-
utor along with his wife and one other indiv-
idual formed a private corporation called 
Arson and Fraud Investigation (AFI) which 
was designed to provide jobs in arson invest-
igation for the several employees of the 
County Attorney's Arson Task Force who 
had been notified that their positions would 
terminate as of July 1, 1981. AFI performed 
eight investigations in Idaho, Wyoming, and 
Utah, and he personally participated in many 
of these investigations. He did not advise the 
Salt Lake County Attorney about the incorp-
oration of AFI. In June of 1981, when the 
Salt Lake County Attorney became aware of 
its existence, he asked the prosecutor to disa-
ssociate himself from the business. AFI 
terminated its business operations by Septe-
mber of 1981 and filed Articles of Dissolu-
tion on December 8, 1982. Thus, the prosec-
utor had been uninvolved in the operations of 
AFI for approximately one year by the time 
defendants were brought to trial in June of 
1982; 
U.C.A., 1953, §67-16-4(4), provides that 
"no public officer or public employee shall ... 
[a]ccept other employment which he might 
expect would impair his independence of 
judgment in the performance of his public 
duties." A public prosecutor who is involved 
with a corporation that investigates possible 
arson and insurance fraud cases for insurance 
companies should not also be representing the 
state in the prosecution of similar cases. This 
would appear to be a conflict of interest. The 
pivotal issue here, however, becomes whether 
in this instance, defendants were entitled to a 
new trial because of an apparent conflict of 
interest. 
The State cites Wright v. United States, 
732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1984), where the 
Court of Appeals advocated a scaled appr-
oach to the review of prosecutorial conflict of 
interest claims. Specifically, it stated that: 
[T]he degree of prosecutorial miscon-
duct ... and the degree of prejudice ton ;' 
the defendant necessary to justify^-^ 
action by a reviewing court steadily i ^ ; 
increase as the case goes forward, 
with the least being required on a..» 
motion to disqualify, somewhat more* 
on a pretrial motion* to dismiss an 
indictment, still more on a motion in 
the district court after conviction but .... 
before appeal, [and] somewhat more 
on a direct appeal.... '...'.• 
Id. at 1056 n. 8. 
It is clear that a prosecutor should be disq-
ualified on a timely motion when he has a 
personal conflicting' interest in a case. Here, 
however, defendants failed to move in the 
trial court to disqualify the prosecutor and 
only now, on appeal, assert a denial of due 
process and equal protection. In these circu-
mstances, we must require that defendants 
prove actual prejudice. United States v. 
Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
cert, denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982). Defendants 
have made no showing of actual prejudice. 
To the extent that defendants might receive 
relief from the prosecution solely on a 
showing of potential prejudice, they would 
become the undeserving beneficiaries of a 
rule that attempts to promote the public; 
good. As we noted above, the business of 
AFI terminated its operations in September 
of 1981; defendants were not brought to trial 
until June of 1982. Any conflict the prosec-
utor had between AFI and defendants' case 
had been severed long prior to the trial. All 
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work performed by him on this case from the 
time of the fire in October of 1980 until June 
of 1981, when he discontinued his association 
with AFI, was performed in his capacity as 
Deputy County Attorney. AFI played no part 
in the investigation. Defendants correctly 
note that the same prosecutor's misconduct 
caused reversal of an earlier arson conviction 
by this Court in State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1984). However, the facts requiting 
reversal in that case, i.e., the inappropriate 
comments made by the prosecutor during 
opening and closing statements, are not anal-
ogous to the conflict of interest issue prese-
nted here. Absent a showing of actual preju-
dice which the defendants were unable to 
make, we find no error which would justify a 
new trial, and the lower court properly 
denied their motion. 
Convictions affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R, Hall, Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
1. This Rule is comparable in substance to 
former Rule 1(2), Utah R. Evid. (1971); the 
former Rule, in effect at the trial in this 
action, defines "relevant evidence" as that 
having a tendency to prove or disprove the 
existence of any "material fact." The 
application of former Rule 1(2) by this Court 
in State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 
1977), is harmonious with the new language. 
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